Basically, it looks like Genode is about the only way to be NSA-proof. Yes, the NSA will likely be able to tell that you're using Genode, but they won't be as able to hack it as with Tails. On Jun 14, 2015 6:01 PM, "Jookia" <166291@...9...> wrote:
Hi!
I use Tor as part of my threat model on my machine, and I think Genode could certainly help me manage things like this. I'm very interested in working towards a Genode parallel of Qubes which could be used for such a thing like Whonix where routing is transparent to an extent.
However, I would hesitate to say we could make a Tails equivalent. Like with Tor, everyone needs to be using the same tools to avoid fingerprinting. No matter what you do, it's going to be obvious you're running Genode instead of Tails. Perhaps sitting a Tails virtual machine inside Genode would be a better idea given that if it's compromised it'd appear to just be Tails.
For better integration, perhaps a block of memory could be established to share a shell and X11 windows, and have the virtual machine read to this. Such a block of memory could be enabled by default meaning there'd be no way to know it was actually used. Of course this would also be useful for hardware exploits, but I don't think that's part of Tails' threat model.
Cheers, Jookia.
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