Query regarding extracting instruction which caused a data-abort exception
rijurekha at ...71...
rijurekha at ...71...
Wed Jun 14 14:48:18 CEST 2017
Interestingly, the DFAR contains an UART address when UART is made secure
in csu_config.h and an eSDHC address when eSDHC is made secure in
csu_config.h. But this might still be a case of asynchronous abort, only
that DFAR is still pointing to the correct address where the instruction
faulted (not more data aborts have occurred since then), but the other
registers have changed because of the asynchronous nature of the abort.
How can we know if the abort is asynchronous vs. synchronous? Is an lr_abt
with all 0's already a clear indication that this is asynchronous, and
there is no hope for device emulation?
> Thanks Stefan!
> We are actually trying to do device emulation in the secure world genode,
> for peripherals marked as secure (UART or ESDHC) in csu_config.h. We got
> encouraged by the following discussion at
> The basic idea of emulating device access is to let the hypervisor pass
> control to the VMM as soon as the non-secure OS accesses an address
> outside the permitted physical address ranges. The VMM can then inspect
> the address in question and the program counter of the non-secure OS that
> raised the access violation. Given the program counter value, the VMM can
> fetch and decode the faulting instruction and emulate it in software.
> Because ARM is a RISC architecture, the instruction decoding is rather
> simple. The instruction in question can only be a load or a store
> instruction. No other instruction would raise an access fault. For read
> operations, the VMM would provide the result of the operation by changing
> the corresponding entry of the VM state structure.
> That said, we found that the trap-and-execute emulation model is not
> possible to implement with the TrustZone protection mechanisms in general.
> Dependent on the concrete platform, the CPU will not immediately enter the
> hypervisor when the fault occurs but attempts to perform the bus
> transaction. This transaction will trigger an external data abort. This
> abort is similar to a device interrupt. It principally raises an exception
> (so the violation can be detected) but not always immediately. Therefore,
> there is no way to uniquely reconstruct what happened in between the
> invalid access and the reception of the external abort exception in the
> hypervisor. Neither can the hypervisor recover the non-secure world to a
> useful state.
> A noteworthy advantage of the CSU compared to the ARM TZ protection
> controller within the ARM Cortex A9 reference board is the way of how
> access violations are handled. As stated in Device emulation, the ARM TZ
> protection controller responds to invalid accesses with an asynchronous
> external abort exception, similar to a device interrupt. Upon the
> execution of an offending instruction, the TZ protection controller
> detects the violation, yet the CPU would continue the execution of further
> instructions until the flagged violation eventually reaches the CPU,
> triggering an external abort exception. This scheme effectively rules out
> any attempt to emulate device accesses. In contrast, the i.MX CSU responds
> to access violations by synchronously yielding control to the exception
> handler. So when such an exception occurs, the offending instruction can
> be determined and emulated in software. However, even though device
> emulation using the CSU is principally possible, we haven't investigated
> this opportunity further.
> We want to read the instruction faulting in NW linux in tz_vmm,
> disassemble it, emulate it in genode code and restart the VM at the next
> instruction of the normal world. Do you think this is feasible, or your
> comments about "synchronous data abort in IMX53 vs. asynchronous aborts in
> Versatile Express" don't hold always?
>> On 06/13/2017 11:17 AM, Abhishek Kumar wrote:
>>> I am trying to modify genode trustzone. I want to read the instruction
>>> which lead to data abort exception in normal world, in the `dump`
>>> function in tz_vmm. I have value of all the registers through `_state`
>>> register. We tried with `_state->ip`. On converting 16 bits stored at
>>> the address pointed by _state->ip, we got ARM Thumb instruction:
>>> STRH R0, [R0, #6]
>>> But the value (R0) + 6, doesn't match dfar. We're not sure if
>>> is the register to go with. We tried with _state->mode.lr which is
>>> lr_abt register. But the address stored in lr_abt, lr_abt-16, lr_abt-32
>>> all have 0s.
>>> Which is right register to get the address of the instruction which
>>> caused the data-abort exception?
>> As long as you get an synchronous data-abort from the normal world,
>> reading the current instruction pointer of the 'state' structure is
>> perfectly fine. The mode-specific lr register is useful for the handling
>> of MMU faults within the "normal" world itself. They are not modified,
>> as long as the "normal" world MMU can resolve an access, but some bus
>> resp. CSU is answering that the access is not allowed. This will not
>> change the "normal" world register set.
>> On the other hand, in general a bus fault triggered by unallowed access
>> of the "normal" world does not necessarily mean a synchronous
>> data-abort, although on i.MX53 I only observed those. In general, it can
>> also provoke an asynchronous external data-abort, which means that the
>> instruction pointer is not necessarily pointing to the instruction that
>> triggered the fault.
>> Moreover, looking at the "normal" world's memory from the secure side is
>> troublesome. Because the normal and secure world's memory view is not
>> cache-coherent. Cache entries are always tagged by the NS bit. That
>> means you have to take care to flush caches yourself. If you want to
>> debug instructions, you should instead look at the Linux binary itself
>> and not into the memory on the secure side. To me it looks strange that
>> you identify a Thumb instruction in the kernel here.
>> Btw. these kind of TrustZone/i.MX53 questions were asked repeatedly in
>> the past, and are mostly answered in our TrustZone report:
>> and in the discussions of our mailing list:
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>> Stefan Kalkowski
>> Genode Labs
>> https://github.com/skalk · http://genode.org/
>> Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
>> engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot
>> genode-main mailing list
>> genode-main at lists.sourceforge.net
> Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most
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